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Abstract—This position paper discusses on-going work on
architectures and algorithms for efficient but privacy-preserving
storage and analysis of bulk biomedical data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Biomedical information is enduring a revolution: collection
and storage of biological material is getting systematic (tissues,
fluids, etc.), both for clinical and research purposes; digital rep-
resentations of these samples are exploding in volume, espe-
cially in genomics (DNA) thanks to a large extent to the advent
of the so-called Next-Generation-Sequencing (NGS) machines.
These machines have lowered the price and increased the
speed of sequencing, by several orders of magnitude. Over
the past few years, the number of sequenced genomes or
exomes (parts thereof) has sky-rocketed, and the trend is there
to continue. Bottomline: (i) full-genome sequencing for less
than one thousand euros is becoming a reality; and (ii) the life-
cycle of the physical biological material stored in biobanks is
too expensive to sustain the current growth. In consequence,
every day we have quite a few additional dozens of terabytes of
stored raw digital data, and the combined scale of biomedical
datasets and related data from their stakeholders, has in fact
entered the row of big data.
II. PROBLEMS ON THE HORIZON
There are fantastic opportunities in this new world, but
there are at least as many threats and challenges. We just
enumerate the few ones we consider of most importance,
starting by introducing their causes.
First, the need for economically storing and processing
these huge amounts of data has put cloud computing on the
agenda, inclusively by NGS machine vendors 1. Not just any
cloud, but including public clouds, and not just very restricted
access, but including Internet web-based access [1]. Using
common (and moderate security) IT techniques to manipulate
such critical data, brings about considerable security and
privacy risks whose likelihood and impact have perhaps not
been correctly evaluated so far, given the recurring failures in
the internet/cloud complex [2]–[4].
Second, a dramatic increase of the availability of personally
identifiable information (PII) has been occurring in parallel,
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due not only but largely to concurrent effects like: the (some-
times forced, e.g. by governments or companies) digitalization
of society activity; the web in general; and social networks
activity in particular. Our lifes leave an evergrowing indelible
digital trace, and this has had an effect whose consequences
we are still starting to comprehend: big data in this case means
that there are too many data around, and statistical correlations
which were infeasible a few years ago, become trivial, and
with astonishing precision and recall. Recent happenings go
from real-life episodes as reported in [5], to impressive re-
identification of private credit card operations, as in [6]. But
research results in the context of biomedical data are much
more worrying. In 2000, an alarm was raised [7], by demon-
strating the re-identifiability of de-identified patient-specific
medical data, and thus showing the ineffectiveness of the de-
identification methods used. Thirteen years later, not much had
changed in the meantime, since the work in [8] managed to
re-identify more than 10% of the de-identified 1000-Genomes
project database, generously built from anonymous donors’
sequenced DNA, again because useful correlations could be
found with the judged anonymous metadata in the genomes
database.
Last but not least, there is a great pressure to get hold of
biomedical data, by reasons of different nature, and coming
from diverse angles, such as researchers, corporations and
even governments. This confluence of interests is sometimes
detrimental of the investigation and deployment of clear and
sound strategies, policies and technologies that help solve the
problem at hand in this paper: addressing the privacy vs.
sharing dilemma we face with regard to biomedical data.
The remainder of the paper discusses some contributions
in that line.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR SOLUTIONS
In a recent paper [9], we advanced an architectural frame-
work to guide possible solutions to a range of problems around
the biomedical data scenario. We predicted the advent of
the new era of e-Biobanking, in terms of the “creation of
genuine hybrid ecosystems composed of interplaying physical
and computer storage and processing infrastructures, handling
physical and computerized samples of biological data, in a
symbiotic and seamless way”. The vision, depicted in Figure 1,
foresaw that systems originally decoupled from each other
(Fig. 1a), would progressively evolve toward coalitions of in-
terested stakeholders, organised around hybrid and/or federated
cloud computing technologies (Fig. 1b), and where techniques
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Fig. 1. The e-Biobanking vision
safeguarding security and dependability might be effectively
deployed, whilst promoting the desired sharing.
The vision has been slowly coming to fruition. For exam-
ple, the BioBankCloud project proposes storage architectures
which are based on clouds-of-clouds, that is, multiple instances
of clouds, both private and public, from several stakeholders
and providers, but which are perceived seamlessly as a single
cloud, by the e-biobank users and administrators [10].
In [11], researchers propose a federated system enabling
the cooperative analysis of NGS sequences across multiple
locations. Despite the security mechanisms being at the level
of standard IT, this is an interesting step forward.
In another work [12], the authors propose a privacy-
preserving method where they encrypt all genomic data before
storing it, and manually mask the few genomic variations
identified as sensitive. Despite the possible coverage gaps and
errors of the manual process, and update problems, this method
yields prevention at early stages of the life-cycle.
In some recent work, we and colleagues at the University of
Lisboa, have proposed a high-throughput method to automat-
ically segregate genomic information right after it is created,
that is, at the exit of NGS machines [13]. The proposed
scheme, depicted in Figure 2, fits the e-biobanking vision
nicely: very sensitive data is kept within the private premises
of the entity generating the data, e.g., a secure data center
next to the NGS machines subsystems, segregated from the
outside, whereas less sensitive data can be stored in cloud
systems of a lower privacy/security category. All this is done
automatically, through a rule-based system acting pretty much
like an intrusion detection system, and with high-throughput,
by resorting to a Bloom filter.
Part of this data, despite being less sensitive, may still
have considerable privacy requirements, and can for example
be stored in public cloud-of-clouds systems, protected with
powerful state-of-the art encryption, coding and dispersion
mechanisms, such as those proposed in [14].
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Relying on a public cloud to store and process the massive
biomedial data production presents privacy issues. However, it
is of prime importance to allow requests of, or over, biomedical
Fig. 2. Privacy filtering: automatic segregation of NGS data
data to be treated, e.g., for research or medicine purposes, as
soon as no sensitive information is leaked.
We are extending the e-biobanking vision, recently pro-
posed to overcome these limitations, in several aspects. First,
we are incorporating the sequence analysis subtasks (e.g.,
alignments of reads to a reference) to handle and protect
genomic data as soon as it is produced. Second, we consider
function-shipping and data-shipping methods to issue queries.
Important challenges include maintaining performance and
functionalities, enforcing security and preserving privacy.
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